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Summary
Reconciliation is a procedure under the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 by
which Congress implements budget resolution policies affecting mainly permanent
spending and revenue programs.  The principal focus in the reconciliation process has
been deficit reduction, but in recent years reconciliation has encompassed revenue
reduction generally and spending increases in selected program areas.  Although
reconciliation is an optional procedure, it has been used most years since its first use
in 1980 (16 reconciliation bills were enacted into law and three were vetoed).
During the first several years’ experience with reconciliation, the legislation
contained many provisions that were extraneous to the purpose of implementing
budget resolution policies.  The reconciliation submissions of committees included
such things as provisions that had no budgetary effect, that increased spending or
reduced revenues when the reconciliation instructions called for reduced spending
or increased revenues, or that violated another committee’s jurisdiction.
In 1985 and 1986, the Senate adopted the Byrd rule (named after its principal
sponsor, Senator Robert C. Byrd) on a temporary basis as a means of curbing these
practices.  The Byrd rule has been extended and modified several times over the
years.  In 1990, the Byrd rule was incorporated into the Congressional Budget Act of
1974 as Section 313 and made permanent (2 U.S.C. 644).
A Senator opposed to the inclusion of extraneous matter in reconciliation
legislation may offer an amendment (or a motion to recommit the measure with
instructions) that strikes such provisions from the legislation, or, under the Byrd rule,
a Senator may raise a point of order against such matter.  In general, a point of order
authorized under the Byrd rule may be raised in order to strike extraneous matter
already in the bill as reported or discharged (or in the conference report), or to
prevent the incorporation of extraneous matter through the adoption of amendments
or motions.  A motion to waive the Byrd rule, or to sustain an appeal of the ruling of
the chair on a point of order raised under the Byrd rule, requires the affirmative vote
of three-fifths of the membership (60 Senators if no seats are vacant).
The Byrd rule provides six definitions of what constitutes extraneous matter for
purposes of the rule (and several exceptions thereto), but the term is generally
described as covering provisions unrelated to achieving the goals of the reconciliation
instructions.
The Byrd rule has been applied to 19 reconciliation measures considered by the
Senate from 1985 through 2003.  In 42 of the 55 actions involving the Byrd rule,
opponents were able to strike extraneous matter from legislation (18 cases) or bar the
consideration of extraneous amendments (24 cases) by raising points of order.  Nine
of 41 motions to waive the Byrd rule, in order to retain or add extraneous matter,
were successful.  The Byrd rule has been used only four times during consideration
of a conference report on a reconciliation measure (twice in 1993, once in 1995, and
once in 1997).  This report will be updated as developments warrant.
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The Budget Reconciliation Process:
The Senate's “Byrd Rule”
Introduction
Reconciliation is a process established under Section 310 of the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344), as amended.  The purpose of reconciliation is to
change substantive law so that revenue and mandatory spending levels are brought
into line with budget resolution policies.  Reconciliation generally has been used to
reduce the deficit through spending reductions or revenue increases, or a combination
of the two.  In recent years, however, the reconciliation process also has encompassed
revenue reduction generally and spending increases in selected program areas.
Reconciliation is a two-step process.  Under the first step, reconciliation
instructions are included in the budget resolution, directing one or more committees
in each House to develop legislation that changes spending or revenues (or both) by
the amounts specified in the budget resolution.  If more than one committee in each
House is given instructions, each instructed committee submits reconciliation
legislation to its respective Budget Committee, which incorporates all submissions,
without any substantive revision, into a single, omnibus budget reconciliation
measure.  Reconciliation procedures during a session usually have applied to multiple
committees and involved omnibus legislation.
Under the second step, the omnibus budget reconciliation measure is considered
in the House and Senate under expedited procedures (for example, debate time in the
Senate on a reconciliation measure is limited to 20 hours and amendments must be
germane).  The process culminates with enactment of the measure, thus putting the
policies of the budget resolution into effect.
Reconciliation, which was first used by the House and Senate in 1980, is an
optional procedure, but it has been used in most years.  Over the 24-year period from
1980-2003, 16 reconciliation bills were enacted into law and three were vetoed.
During the first several years’ experience with reconciliation, the legislation
contained many provisions that were extraneous to the purpose of reducing the
deficit.  The reconciliation submissions of committees included such things as
provisions that had no budgetary effect, that increased spending or reduced revenues,
or that violated another committee’s jurisdiction.
In 1985 and 1986, the Senate adopted the Byrd rule (named after its principal
sponsor, Senator Robert C. Byrd) as a means of curbing these practices.  Initially, the
rule consisted of two components, involving a provision in a reconciliation act and
a Senate resolution.  The Byrd rule has been modified several times over the years.
CRS-2
1 For a detailed legislative history of the Byrd rule, see the following print of the Senate
Budget Committee:  Budget Process Law Annotated—1993 Edition, by William G. Dauster,
103rd Congress, 1st Session, S. Prt. 103-49, October 1993, notes on pages 229-246.
2 The Senate’s consideration of and vote on the amendment occurred on pages S14032-
S14038 of the Congressional Record of October 24, 1985.
The purpose of this report is to briefly recount the legislative history of the Byrd
rule, summarize its current features, and describe its implementation from its
inception through the present.
Legislative History of the Byrd Rule
During the first five years that the Byrd rule was in effect, from late 1985 until
late 1990, it consisted of two separate components—(1) a provision in statute
applying to initial Senate consideration of reconciliation measures, and (2) a Senate
resolution extending application of portions of the statutory provision to conference
reports and amendments between the two Houses.  Several modifications were made
to the Byrd rule in 1986 and 1987, including extending its expiration date from
January 2, 1987, to January 2, 1988, and then to September 30, 1992, but the two
separate components of the rule were preserved.  In 1990, these components were
merged together and made permanent when they were incorporated into the
Congressional Budget Act (CBA) of 1974 as Section 313.  There have been no
further changes in the Byrd rule since 1990.
The Byrd rule originated on October 24, 1985, when Senator Robert C. Byrd,
on behalf of himself and others, offered Amendment No. 878 (as modified) to S.
1730, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985.1
The Senate adopted the amendment by a vote of 96-0.2  In this form, the Byrd rule
applied to initial Senate consideration of reconciliation measures.
Senator Byrd explained that the basic purposes of the amendment were to
protect the effectiveness of the reconciliation process (by excluding extraneous
matter that often provoked controversy without aiding deficit reduction efforts) and
to preserve the deliberative character of the Senate (by excluding from consideration
under expedited procedures legislative matters not central to deficit reduction that
should be debated under regular procedures).  He opened his remarks by stating:
. . . we are in the process now of seeing . . . the Pandora’s box which has been
opened to the abuse of the reconciliation process.  That process was never meant
to be used as it is being used.  There are 122 items in the reconciliation bill that
are extraneous.  Henceforth, if the majority on a committee should wish to
include in reconciliation recommendations to the Budget Committee any
measure, no matter how controversial, it can be brought to the Senate under an
ironclad built-in time agreement that limits debate, plus time on amendments and
motions, to no more than 20 hours.
It was never foreseen that the Budget Reform Act would be used in that way.
So if the budget reform process is going to be preserved, and more importantly
if we are going to preserve the deliberative process in this U.S. Senate—which
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3 See the remarks of Senator Robert C. Byrd on page S14032 of the Congressional Record
of October 24, 1985.
P.L. 99-272, Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Section
2001 (100 Stat. 390-391), April 7, 1986.
S.Res. 286 (99th Congress, 1st Session),
December 19, 1985.
S.Res. 509 (99th Congress, 2nd Session),
October 16, 1986.
P.L. 99-509, Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1986, Section 7006 (100
Stat. 1949-1950), October 21, 1986.
P.L. 100-119, Increasing the Statutory
Limit on the Public Debt, Section 205 (101
Stat. 784-785), September 29, 1987.
P.L. 101-508, Omnibus Budget Reconcili-
ation Act of 1990, Section 13214 (104 Stat.
1388-621 through 1388-623), November 5,
1990.
P.L. 105-33, Balanced Budget Act of
1997, Section 10113(b)(1) (111 Stat. 688),
August 5, 1997.
Figure 1.  Laws and Resolutions
Establishing the Byrd Rule
is the outstanding, unique element with respect to the U.S. Senate, action must
be taken now to stop this abuse of the budget process.3
The Byrd amendment was included in modified form in COBRA of 1985 (P.L.
99-272), which was not enacted into law until April 7, 1986, as Section 20001 (100
Stat. 390-391).  The Byrd rule, in this form, thus became effective on April 7.  As
originally framed, the Byrd rule was set to expire on January 2, 1987.
Over the years, the Senate
has expanded and revised the
Byrd rule through the adoption
of two resolutions and the
inclusion of provisions in four
laws.  Figure 1 lists the laws
and resolutions that have
established and revised the
Byrd rule.
On December 19, 1985,
the Senate adopted by voice
vote a resolution (S.Res. 286),
sponsored by Senator Alan
Simpson and others, that
extended the application of
portions of the statutory
provision to conference reports
and amendments between the
two Houses.  Because the
enactment of COBRA of 1985
was delayed until early 1986,
the portion of the Byrd rule
dealing with conference reports
became effective first.  The
provisions of S.Res. 286 were
set to expire on the same date
as the provision in COBRA of
1985 (January 2, 1987).
In the following year, the
Senate was involved in two
actions affecting the Byrd rule.
First, the Senate adopted S.Res. 509 by voice vote on October 16, 1986.  The
measure, offered by Senator Alan Simpson and others, modified S.Res. 286 in a
technical fashion.  Second, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 was
enacted into law, as P.L. 99-509, on October 21, 1986.  Section 7006 of the law made
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4 Some of the complexities of the Byrd rule are examined in:  (1) Riddick’s Senate
Procedure (S.Doc. 101-28, 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 1992), by Floyd M. Riddick and
Alan S. Frumin, on pages 624-626; and (2) Budget Process Law Annotated—1993 Edition,
by William G. Dauster, op. cit., beginning on page 198.
5 Part of the Byrd rule, Section 313(a), also applies to reconciliation measures considered
pursuant to Section 258C of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985.  This section, which has never been invoked, provides for the consideration of
reconciliation legislation in the fall in order to achieve deficit reductions that would obviate
the need for an expected sequester under the pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) requirement (or,
previously, the deficit targets).  The PAYGO requirement effectively expired at the end of
the 107th Congress (see CRS Report RS21378, Termination of the “Pay-As-You-Go”
(PAYGO) Requirement for FY2003 and Later Years, by Robert Keith.)  All of the
reconciliation measures considered by the Senate thus far have originated pursuant to
Section 310 of the CBA of 1974.
several minor changes in the Byrd rule and extended its expiration date by one
year—until January 2, 1988.
Further changes in the Byrd rule were made in 1987.  These changes were
included in a measure increasing the statutory limit on the public debt, modifying
procedures under the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985,
and making other budget process changes (P.L. 100-119, signed into law on
September 29; see Title II (Budget Process Reform)).  Section 205 of the law added
an item to the list of definitions of extraneous matter in the Byrd rule and extended
its expiration until September 30, 1992.
In 1990, Congress and the President agreed to further modifications of the
budget process by enacting the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1990 (Title XIII
of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990).  Section 13214 of the law made
significant revisions to the Byrd rule and incorporated it (as permanent law) into the
CBA of 1974 as Section 313 (2 U.S.C. 644).
Finally, the Budget Enforcement Act of 1997 (Title X of the Balanced Budget
Act of 1997) made minor technical changes in Section 313 of the CBA of 1974 to
correct drafting problems with the BEA of 1990.
Current Features of the Byrd Rule
A Senator opposed to the inclusion of extraneous matter in reconciliation
legislation has two principal options for dealing with the problem.  First, a Senator
may offer an amendment (or a motion to recommit the measure with instructions)
that strikes such provisions from the legislation.  Second, under the Byrd rule, a
Senator may raise a point of order against extraneous matter.
The Byrd rule is a relatively complex rule4 that applies to two types of
reconciliation measures considered pursuant to Section 310 of the CBA of
1974—reconciliation bills and reconciliation resolutions.5  (A reconciliation
resolution could be used to make changes in legislation that had passed the House
and Senate but had not yet been enrolled and sent to the President.  The practice of
the House and Senate has been to consider only reconciliation bills.) 
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6 In the Senate, many points of order under the Congressional Budget Act require a three-
fifths vote of the membership to waive (or to sustain an appeal of the ruling of the chair).
Most of these three-fifths waiver requirements are temporary, but in the case of the Byrd
rule it is permanent.  (Section 503 of the FY2004 budget resolution, adopted on April 11,
2003, extended the expiration date for the temporary requirements to September 30, 2008.)
7 For an example of such a list, see the remarks of Senator Pete Domenici regarding the
conference report on the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 in the Congressional Record of July
31, 1997, at pages S8406-8408.
8 See the report of the Senate Budget Committee to accompany S.Con.Res. 18, Concurrent
(continued...)
In general, a point of order authorized under the Byrd rule may be raised in order
to strike extraneous matter already in the bill as reported or discharged (or in the
conference report), or to prevent the incorporation of extraneous matter through the
adoption of amendments or motions.  A point of order may be raised against a single
provision or two or more provisions (as designated by title or section number, or by
page and line number), and may be raised against a single amendment or two or more
amendments.  The chair may sustain a point of order as to all of the provisions (or
amendments) or only some of them.
Once material has been stricken from reconciliation legislation under the Byrd
rule, it may not be offered again as an amendment.
A motion to waive the Byrd rule, or to sustain an appeal of the ruling of the
chair on a point of order raised under the Byrd rule, requires the affirmative vote of
three-fifths of the membership (60 Senators if no seats are vacant).6  A single waiver
motion can:  (1) apply to the Byrd rule as well as other provisions of the
Congressional Budget Act; (2) involve multiple as well as single provisions or
amendments; (3) extend (for specified language) through consideration of the
conference report as well as initial consideration of the measure or amendment; and
(4) be made prior to the raising of a point of order, thus making the point of order
moot.
When a reconciliation measure, or a conference report thereon, is considered,
the Senate Budget Committee must submit for the record a list of potentially
extraneous matter included therein.7  This list is advisory, however, and does not bind
the chair in ruling on points of order.
Determinations of budgetary levels for purposes of enforcing the Byrd rule are
made by the Senate Budget Committee.
Definitions of Extraneous Matter.  Subsection (b)(1) of the Byrd rule
provides definitions of what constitutes extraneous matter for purposes of the rule.
The Senate Budget Committee, in its report on the budget resolution for fiscal year
1994, noted:
‘Extraneous’ is a term of art.  Broadly speaking, the rule prohibits inclusion in




Resolution on the Budget, FY 1994 (S.Rept. 103-19, March 12, 1993), at page 49.
A provision is considered to be extraneous if it falls under one or more of the
following six definitions:
(1) it does not produce a change in outlays or revenues;
(2) it produces an outlay increase or revenue decrease when the
instructed committee is not in compliance with its instructions;
(3) it is outside of the jurisdiction of the committee that submitted the
title or provision for inclusion in the reconciliation measure;
(4) it produces a change in outlays or revenues which is merely incidental
to the non-budgetary components of the provision;
(5) it would increase the deficit for a fiscal year beyond those covered by
the reconciliation measure; and
(6) it recommends changes in Social Security.
The last definition complements a ban in Section 310(g) of the CBA of 1974
against considering any reconciliation legislation that contains recommendations
pertaining to the Social Security.  For purposes of these provisions, Social Security
is considered to include the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI)
program established under Title II of the Social Security Act; it does not include
Medicare or other programs established as part of that act.
Exceptions to the Definition of Extraneous Matter.  Subsection (b)(2)
of the Byrd rule provides that a Senate-originated provision that does not produce a
change in outlays or revenues shall not be considered extraneous if the chairman and
ranking minority members of the Budget Committee and the committee reporting the
provision certify that—
! the provision mitigates direct effects clearly attributable to a
provision changing outlays or revenues and both provisions together
produce a net reduction in the deficit; or
! the provision will (or is likely to) reduce outlays or increase
revenues:  (1) in one or more fiscal years beyond those covered by
the reconciliation measure; (2) on the basis of new regulations, court
rulings on pending legislation, or relationships between economic
indices and stipulated statutory triggers pertaining to the provision;
or (3) but reliable estimates cannot be made due to insufficient data.
Additionally, under subsection (b)(1)(A), a provision that does not change
outlays or revenues in the net, but which includes outlay decreases or revenue
CRS-7
9 The Senate also considered two measures linked to the reconciliation process.  On
December 15, 1975, the Senate considered, amended, and passed H.R. 5559, the Revenue
Adjustment Act of 1975, which reduced revenues by about $6.4 billion pursuant to a budget
resolution instruction.  The measure was not regarded as a reconciliation bill when it was
considered by the House, but it was considered under reconciliation procedures in the
Senate.  The President vetoed the measure later in the year and the House sustained his veto.
See the remarks of Senator Russell Long and the presiding officer on page 40540 and the
remarks of Senator Edmund Muskie and others on pages 40544-40550 in the Congressional
Record of December 15, 1975, regarding the status of H.R. 5559 as a reconciliation bill.  
The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-369) was regarded as a reconciliation bill
when it was considered in the House, but was stripped of that classification when it was
considered in the Senate (in April and May of 1984).
For more information on the consideration of reconciliation measures, see CRS Report
RL30458, The Budget Reconciliation Process:  Timing of Legislative Action, by Robert
Keith.
increases that exactly offset outlay increases or revenue decreases, is not considered
to be extraneous.
The full text of the Byrd rule in its current form is provided in Appendix A.
Implementation of the Byrd Rule
Congress and the President considered 19 omnibus reconciliation measures (as
shown in Table 1) between calendar year 1980, when the reconciliation process was
first used, and the present.9  As stated previously, 16 of these measures were enacted
into law and three were vetoed (by President Clinton).  The Byrd rule has been in
effect during the consideration of the last 14 of these 19 measures.  The Byrd rule had
not been established when the first five reconciliation bills were considered.
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103-66 107 Stat. 312-
685
08-10-93
Balanced Budget Act of 1995 (H.R. 2491) (vetoed) 12-06-95
Personal Responsibility and
Budget Reconciliation Act of
1996
104-193 110 Stat. 2105-
2355
08-22-96
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 105-33 111 Stat. 251-
787
08-05-97
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 105-34 111 Stat. 788-
1103
08-05-97
Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act
of 1999
(H.R. 2488) (vetoed) 09-23-99
Marriage Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2000
(H.R. 4810) (vetoed) 08-05-00
Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001
107-16 115 Stat. 38-150 06-07-01
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2003
108-27 117 Stat. 752-
768
05-28-03
The Byrd rule was fully in effect during the consideration of all but the first of
the 14 reconciliation bills.  During consideration of that bill, the Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, the Byrd rule applied to the
consideration of the conference report, but not to initial consideration of the bill.  
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10 The Byrd rule is only one of many point-of-order provisions in Titles III and IV of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, as amended (2 U.S.C. 644).  In some instances, points
of order or waiver motions are made under the Act by general reference only (such as a
Senator raising a point of order “under Title III of the Act”) rather than by specific reference
to the provision(s) involved.  When only general references are made, it usually is
impossible to determine (by reference to debate in the Congressional Record alone) which
provision of the act is involved.  Consequently, this report reflects only those instances when
specific reference was made to Section 313 of the act or to the Byrd rule and may
undercount somewhat the actual number of actions involving the rule.
11 It is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately determine the deterrent effect of the Byrd
rule, so this aspect is not addressed in this report.
There has been a total of 55 actions involving points of order or waiver motions,
or both, under the Byrd rule.10  (A point of order can be raised under the Byrd rule
without a waiver motion being offered; conversely, a waiver motion can be offered
without a point of order having been raised.)  In total, 53 points of order were raised
under the Byrd rule.  In two instances, a point of order was not raised because a
waiver motion previously had been offered and approved, thus making the point of
order moot.
On the whole, actions under the Byrd rule have occurred more frequently in
recent years.  (However, there were no actions under the Byrd rule in 2001 and only
one in 2003, the last two years in which reconciliation was used).  Also, opponents
of extraneous matter in reconciliation legislation generally have used the Byrd rule
successfully.11
Reconciliation legislation has been considered under the Byrd rule over a 19-
year period, covering calendar years 1985-2003.  As Table 2 shows, actions taken
under the Byrd rule were less frequent during the first 10 years of this period (16
actions in total), covering 1985-1994, compared to the remaining nine years (39
actions in total), covering 1995-2003.
With regard to the 55 total actions pertaining to the Byrd rule, 42 involved
actions that resulted in extraneous matter being stricken or barred while 13 involved
actions that resulted in such matter being retained or added.
Of the 53 points of order raised under the Byrd rule, 42 were sustained, enabling
Senators to strike extraneous matter from the legislation in 18 cases and bar the
consideration of extraneous amendments in 24 cases.  Ten of the points of order fell,
either upon the adoption of a waiver motion or upon the ruling of the chair, and one
point of order was withdrawn.
A total of 41 motions to waive the Byrd rule, to permit the inclusion of
extraneous matter, were made.  Nine of these motions were successful, while 32 were
rejected.  (Two other waiver motions were withdrawn and one was changed to a
unanimous consent request.)  Eight of these successful motions were used to protect
committee-reported language in the bill or language in the conference report; only
one motion to protect a floor amendment was successful.
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1985 0 0 0
1986 1 1 2
1987 0 1 1
1988 — — —
1989 0 0 0
1990 5 1 6
1991 — — —
1992 — — —
1993 5 2 7
1994 — — —
Subtotal,
1985-1994 11 5 16
1995 8 0 8
1996 5 1 6
1997 12 5 17
1998 — — —
1999 3 1 4
2000 2 1 3
2001 — — —
2002 — — —
2003 1 0 1
Subtotal,
1995-2003 31 8 39
Total 42 13 55
Eight of the nine successful waiver motions exceeded the required 60-vote
threshold by an average margin of 12 votes (the remaining one was approved by
voice vote), while 31 of the 32 unsuccessful waiver motions fell short of the
threshold by an average of 13 votes (the remaining one was rejected by voice vote).
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12 See the Congressional Record of October 13, 1989, at page S13349.  The Senate
leadership used an amendment for similar purposes during consideration of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981.
Fourteen of the unsuccessful waiver motions garnered at least 51 votes but less than
the 60 votes required to be successful.
Table 3, at the end of this section, provides more detailed information on
actions involving points of order and waiver motions made under the Byrd rule from
1985 through 2003.
The Byrd rule has been used primarily during initial consideration of a
reconciliation measure.  It was invoked only four times—twice in 1993, once in
1995, and once in 1997—during consideration of a conference report.  In 1993, two
points of order against matter characterized as extraneous in a conference report were
rejected by the chair.  In both instances, the chair’s ruling was upheld upon appeal.
The two motions to appeal the chair’s rulings were defeated by identical votes, 43-57.
In 1995, two sections were stricken from a conference report and the two chambers
had to resolve the final differences with a further amendment between them.  In
1997, a section in the conference report was retained following a successful vote (78-
22) to waive a point of order.
In many instances, a point of order was raised against multiple provisions,
sections, or titles of the bill, sometimes covering a variety of different topics.  In a
few cases, the Chair ruled that most, but not all, of the provisions violated the Byrd
rule.
Five of the six definitions of extraneousness (the exception being
recommending changes in Social Security) have been cited as bases for invoking the
Byrd rule.  The most common basis for a point of order has been that the provision
or amendment did not change outlays or revenues.
On three occasions (in 1985, 1989, and 2001), the Senate considered
reconciliation legislation without taking any actions under the Byrd rule.  No actions
were taken under the Byrd rule during consideration of the conference report on the
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, which began on
December 19, 1985; this was the first instance in which the Byrd rule applied.
In 1989, no actions involving the Byrd rule occurred, in large part because the
Senate leadership chose to use an amendment rather than the Byrd rule to deal with
extraneous matter in the bill.  On October 13, 1989, during consideration of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation of 1989, the Senate adopted Mitchell Amendment
No. 1004 by voice vote.  The amendment struck extraneous matter from the bill; its
stated purpose was “to strike all matter from the bill that does not reduce the
deficit.”12
Finally, no actions under the Byrd rule were taken in 2001 during consideration
of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act.  The potential
CRS-12
13 This requirement was added by Section 13214 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1990.  Consequently, its first application was to consideration of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993.
14 See the discussion of “Preemptive Editing of the Conference Report” in Budget Process
Law Annotated—1993 Edition, by William G. Dauster, op. cit., at pages 245-246.  Also, see:
(1) Richard E. Cohen, Running Up Against the “Byrd Rule,” National Journal, September
4, 1993, page 2151; (2) George Hager, The Byrd Rule:  Not an Easy Call, Congressional
Quarterly Weekly Report, July 31, 1993, page 2027; and (3) Mary Jacoby, Senate
Parliamentarian Purges Budget Bill of Measures That Could Violate Byrd Rule, Roll Call,
August 5, 1993, page 9.
application of the Byrd rule to the tax-cut measure was averted by the inclusion of
a “sunset” provision that limited the duration of the tax cuts to 10 years.
Byrd Rule Controversies
Although the Byrd rule has advocates in the House and Senate, its use
sometimes has engendered much controversy between the two Houses.
In 1993 and 1994, during the 103rd Congress, the stringent application of the
Byrd rule by the Senate significantly influenced the final shape of the reconciliation
act.
The House considered its version of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993, H.R. 2264, on May 27.  The Senate considered its version, S. 1134, on June
23 and June 24 (after completing consideration of S. 1134, the Senate amended and
passed H.R. 2264 for purposes of conference with the House).  Senator Pete
Domenici, ranking minority member of the Senate Budget Committee, inserted a list
of potentially extraneous matters included in S. 1134 in the Congressional Record
of June 24 (at page S 7984).13  The list identified more than a dozen sections in five
titles of the bill as possibly being in violation of the Byrd rule, specifically Section
313(b)(1)(A) (i.e., producing no change in outlays or revenues).
At the House-Senate conference stage, the Senate leadership directed the
parliamentarian and Senate Budget Committee staff to thoroughly review the
legislation to identify any provisions originating in the House or Senate that might
violate the Byrd rule.14  As a result of this review, many provisions were deleted from
the legislation in conference.
During Senate consideration of the conference report, Senator James Sasser,
Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, discussed this process:
. . . with regard to the Byrd rule, we worked very hard and very faithfully over
a period of well over a week in going over this bill to try to clarify and remove
items that might be subject to the Byrd rule.
As the distinguished ranking member indicated, I think over 150 items were
removed from the reconciliation instrument here, because it was felt that they
would be subject to the Byrd rule . . .
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15 See the remarks of Senator Sasser in the Congressional Record of August 6, 1993 at page
S10662.
16 See the remarks of Representative Rostenkowski in the Congressional Record of August
5, 1993 at page H6126.  He discusses specific programs dropped from the conference report
because of the Byrd rule at page H6124.  Also, see the remarks that same day of
Representatives de la Garza (at page H6143), Vento (at page H6235), and Stenholm (at page
H6257).
17 Letter from Representative Martin Olav Sabo to Representative Lee H. Hamilton, October
(continued...)
I might say some of our House colleagues could not understand, and I do not
blame them because there were a number of things that were pulled out of this
budget reconciliation that had been voted on and passed by large majorities in
both houses.  But simply because they violated the Byrd rule, we had to go to the
chairmen of the appropriate House committees and tell them they had to come
out.  They simply did not understand it.  I think it made them perhaps have a little
less high esteem for some of us here in the Senate . . .  In the final analysis, their
leadership had to demand that some of these provisions subject to the Byrd rule
come out.15
During House consideration of the conference report, several Democratic
Members criticized the Byrd rule and discussed its impact on the legislation.  For
example, Representative Dan Rostenkowski, chairman of the House Ways and
Means Committee, stated:
. . . I also have to express my grave concerns regarding the other body’s so-called
Byrd rule.  As a result of this procedural rule, policies that would have
significantly improved the Medicare Program could not even be considered.
Over 80 pages of statutory language were stripped out of the Medicare title.
Staff wasted countless hours, scrutinizing every line to ensure that there is
nothing that would upset our friends at the other end of the Capitol.  Even more
absurd is the fact that most of the items stripped were minor and technical
provisions that received bipartisan support when they passed both the House and
the Senate last year.
I hope that Members on both sides of the aisle share my grave concerns about
how this rule has been used, and its impact on reconciliation.  I sincerely hope
that this rule will be reconsidered before we ever return to the reconciliation
process again.16
Controversy over the Byrd rule persisted during late 1993 and into 1994.  The
Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, co-chaired by Representative Lee
Hamilton and Senator David Boren, was slated to make recommendations on
congressional reform, including changes in the budget process, in December of 1993.
Representative Martin Olav Sabo, chairman of the House Budget Committee, wrote
to Co-Chair Hamilton in October, telling him that “widespread use [of the Byrd rule]
this year was extremely destructive and bodes ill for the reconciliation process in the
future.”  Further, he stated that “the use of mechanisms like the Byrd rule greatly
distorts the balance of power between the two bodies” and that strict enforcement of




26, 1993, 2 pages.
18 See Organization of the Congress:  Final Report of the Senate Members of the Joint
Committee on the Organization of Congress, Sen. Rept. 103-215, Vol. I, December 1993,
pages 14 and 15.
19 The letter is discussed in:  Karen Foerstel, Byrd Rule War Erupts Once Again, Roll Call,
February 24, 1994, pages 1 and 13.
20 See the following article for a discussion of the Sabo bill:  Mary Jacoby, Sabo Bill Would
Kill Byrd Rule For Good, Roll Call, July 25, 1994, page 12.
21 See Sections 104 and 105 of H.Con.Res. 68, the FY2000 budget resolution (the
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Chairman Sabo attached two Budget Committee staff documents to his letter:
(1) a 29-page listing of reconciliation provisions “dropped or modified” in conference
in order to comply with the Byrd rule, and (2) a 3-page statement identifying specific
problems caused by the rule (including a bar against including authorizations savings
in reconciliation, the forcing of piecemeal legislation, incentives to use
counterproductive drafting techniques to mitigate effects, and a bar against provisions
achieving savings or promoting efficiency when the Congressional Budget Office
was unable to assign particular savings to them).
The Senate Members of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress
recommended in their final report that a provision clarifying “that the ‘Byrd rule’ is
permanent, applies to conference reports, requires sixty votes to waive, and applies
to extraneous matters” be included in a broad reform bill.18  Legislation embodying
the Senate recommendations (S. 1824) was introduced on February 3, 1994 (the
recommendation pertaining to the Byrd rule was set forth in Section 312 of the bill).
The House Members of the Joint Committee did not include any recommendations
regarding the Byrd rule in their report or legislation (H.R. 3801, also introduced on
February 3, 1994).
The day after the two reform bills were introduced, the chairmen of 15 House
committees wrote to Speaker Tom Foley.  They urged him to meet with Senate
Majority Leader George Mitchell in order to get Section 312 of S. 1824, dealing with
the Byrd rule, removed from the reform package.19
On July 19, 1994, Chairman Sabo introduced H.R. 4780.  The bill would have
amended the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 to make the Byrd rule “applicable
to the Senate only,” chiefly by removing references to conference reports in Section
313 of the Act.20
None of the three bills cited above were acted upon before the 103rd Congress
adjourned.
During the 106th Congress, the budget resolutions for FY2000 and FY2001
included reconciliation instructions directing the House Ways and Means and Senate
Finance Committees to develop legislation implementing substantial reductions in
revenue.21  The reconciliation instructions in the two budget resolutions called for
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21 (...continued)
conference report was H.Rept. 106-91, April 14, 1999), and Sections 103 and 104 of
H.Con.Res. 290, the FY2001 budget resolution (the conference report was H.Rept. 106-577,
April 12, 2000).  The FY2001 budget resolution also included reconciliation instructions
directing the House Ways and Means Committee to develop legislation reducing the debt
held by the public.
22 The instructions in the FY2000 budget resolution covered 10 fiscal years, while the
instructions in the FY2001 budget resolution covered five fiscal years.  The reconciliation
instructions in the FY2000 budget resolution also provided for total revenue reductions of
$778 billion over 10 years.
23 Proceedings under this aspect of the Byrd rule, in the case of the Taxpayer Refund and
Relief Act of 1999, occurred on July 28, 1999 (see the remarks of Senators Roth, Moynihan,
Conrad, Gramm, and others in the Congressional Record of that date on pages S9478-84).
With regard to the Marriage Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2000, see the remarks of
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total revenue reduction over five years of $142 billion and $150 billion,
respectively.22  Neither budget resolution included any instructions regarding
spending.  This marked the first time that the House and Senate had recommended
substantial reductions in revenue through the reconciliation process without
offsetting savings to be achieved in spending programs.  Any resultant reconciliation
legislation was expected under these budget resolutions to reduce large surpluses, not
to incur or worsen deficits.
In each of these two years, there was controversy in the Senate regarding the
appropriateness of using reconciliation procedures under circumstances that
worsened the federal government’s fiscal posture.  Some Senators argued that the use
of reconciliation, with its procedural restrictions that sharply curtail debate time and
limit the offering of amendments in comparison to the usual Senate procedures, could
be justified only when it was necessary to reduce or eliminate a deficit (or to preserve
or increase a surplus).  Other Senators maintained that reconciliation is neutral in its
orientation—the language in Section 310 of the CBA of 1974 refers to “changes” in
spending and revenue amounts, not increases or decreases—and is intended to
expedite the consideration of important and potentially complex budgetary
legislation.
Against the backdrop of the larger issue of the appropriate use of reconciliation
under these circumstances, Senators also debated in particular the impact of the Byrd
rule on the scope of the resultant tax-cut legislation.  One of the determinants of
extraneousness under the Byrd rule is whether the legislation reduces revenues or
increases spending in the net beyond the period to which the reconciliation
instructions apply.  Changes in tax law, however, often are made on a permanent
basis.  As a consequence, reconciliation legislation recommending permanent tax
cuts may run afoul of the Byrd rule.
During consideration of the Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999 and the
Marriage Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2000, the Byrd rule was used successfully
to ensure the inclusion of sunset provisions in the bills, limiting the effectiveness of
the tax cuts to the period covered by the reconciliation instructions.23
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Senator Roth in the Congressional Record of July 14, 2000, on pages S6782-84.
24 See, for example, the remarks of Senator Robert C. Byrd, “Reconciliation Process
Reform,” in the Congressional Record of February 15, 2001, on pages S1532-36, and
opening remarks of Senator Byrd and others during Senate consideration of H.R. 1836 in
the Congressional Record of May 17, 2001, beginning on page S5028.
25 See H.Rept. 108-71 (April 10, 2003).
During the first session of the 107th Congress, the Senate again addressed these
issues as it considered H.R. 1836, largely embodying President Bush’s proposal for
a $1.6 trillion tax cut.24  In addition to debating the appropriateness of using the
reconciliation process to expedite tax-cut legislation, Senators argued for and against
the inclusion of the 10-year “sunset” provision necessary to achieve compliance with
the Byrd rule.  Some Senators maintained that permanent changes in tax law should
be allowed under reconciliation procedures, just as they often are customarily made
in freestanding tax legislation.  Other Senators praised the value of being able to
reexamine such significant modifications in budgetary policy in future years when
economic circumstances may have changed materially.
The sunset provision was retained in the final version of the legislation, as
Section 901 (115 Stat. 150) of P.L. 107-16, the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001.
In 2003, during the first session of the 108th Congress, the Byrd rule influenced
the form of revenue reconciliation directives in the FY2004 budget resolution
(H.Con.Res. 95).25  Initially, House and Senate leaders indicated that they would
settle on a conference agreement instructing the House Ways and Means Committee
to reduce revenues through reconciliation by $550 billion or more for the period
covering FY2003-2013 and the Senate Finance Committee to reduce revenues by
$350 billion for the same period.  A majority of Senators had indicated their
opposition to revenue reductions greater than $350 billion.
The use of dual reconciliation instructions in the budget resolution would enable
the leadership to secure passage of the budget resolution while leaving open the
possibility that a subsequent conference on the differing versions of the revenue
reconciliation measure passed by the two Houses might reach an acceptable
compromise between these two amounts.
However, it soon became apparent that, if the Senate initially passed a revenue
reconciliation measure consistent with the directive in the budget resolution (i.e.,
reducing revenues by $350 billion), the later consideration of a conference agreement
reflecting a compromise level of revenue reductions greater than $350 billion could
violate the Byrd rule.  In particular, Section 313(b)(1)(B) defines as extraneous any
provision reported by a committee that  reduces revenues (or increases outlays) if the
net effect of all of the committee’s provisions is that it fails to achieve its
reconciliation instructions.  Proposing revenue reductions greater than the level of
reductions set in the reconciliation instructions would be considered a failure to
achieve the instructions.
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26 The reconciliation directives are set forth in Section 201 of H.Con.Res. 95; the Senate
point of order is set forth in Section 202.  A portion of the reconciled amounts is set forth
as outlay increases in order to accommodate changes in tax programs (e.g., refundable tax
credits) that are scored as outlays.  Consequently, the aggregate instruction of $550 billion
is actually $535 billion in revenue reductions and $15 billion in outlay increases in the
House, and $522.524 billion in revenue reductions and $27.476 billion in outlay increases
in the Senate.
27 For further discussion of this matter, see CRS Report RL31902, Revenue Reconciliation
Directives in the FY2004 Budget Resolution, by Robert Keith.  Also, see:  (1) “Concessions
to Moderates Imperil Early GOP Tax Cutting Accord,” by Andrew Taylor, CQ Weekly,
April 12, 2003; and (2) “Grassley Promises GOP Moderates Final Tax Cut Will Not Top
$350 Billion,” by Bud Newman, BNA’s Daily Report for Executives, Monday, April 14,
2003, page G-7.
28 See the remarks of Senator Max Baucus in the Congressional Record of April 11, 2003,
at pages S5296-5298, in which he inserts a letter from Senate Parliamentarian Alan Frumin
to Senate Democratic Leader Thomas Daschle regarding the potential application of the
Byrd rule to the consideration of reconciliation legislation.
29 See the remarks of Senator Grassley in the Congressional Record of April 11, 2003, at
pages S5295-5296.
30 See the CBO cost estimate on H.R. 2 (108th Congress) of May 23, 2003, available at
[www.cbo.gov]; the bill became P.L. 108-27, the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2003.
In order to resolve the problem, the conference agreement on the FY2004
budget resolution instructed both the House Ways and Means Committee and the
Senate Finance Committee to reduce revenues by $550 billion over FY2003-2013,
but a point of order barred the initial consideration in the Senate of a reconciliation
measure (as distinct from a conference report) containing revenue reductions in
excess of $350 billion for this period.26  The FY2004 budget resolution further
provided that the Senate point of order could be waived only by the affirmative vote
of three-fifths of the Members duly chosen and sworn (i.e., 60 Senators, if no seats
are vacant).  This procedural formulation strengthened the position of those who
favored initial Senate passage of a reconciliation measure limited to $350 billion in
revenue reductions, but removed the potential Byrd rule hurdle should a majority of
Senators later choose to support a conference agreement providing as much as $550
billion in revenue reductions.27
Senator Max Baucus, the ranking minority member of the Senate Finance
Committee, questioned whether the directive to the committee should be regarded as
$350 billion or $550 billion.28  Ultimately, Senator Charles Grassley, chairman of the
Senate Finance Committee, indicated that he had reached agreement with other
Senators to adhere to the $350 billion level in the conference on the reconciliation
measure, notwithstanding the fact that the limitation in Section 202 of the budget
resolution only applied to initial consideration of the measure.29  The resultant
reconciliation measure (H.R. 2), according to final estimates of the Congressional
Budget Office and Joint Tax Committee, contained $349.7 billion in revenue
reductions and related outlay changes.30 
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Table 3.  Listing of Actions Under the Senate’s Byrd Rule
(Calendar Years 1985 Through 2003)
Object of
point of order a
Basis of
point of order b Subject matter Waiver motion c
Disposition of
point of order
1.  Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 d
To Strike Provision(s) From Bill or Conference Report
[none]
To Bar Consideration of Amendment(s)
[not applicable]
2.  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986
To Strike Provision(s) From Bill or Conference Report
Section 403 Outlay increase when
committee not in
compliance
Conservation programs Rejected, 32-61 Sustained; section stricken
(September 19, 1986)
Page 139, line 1-p. 161,




Program fraud civil remedies Approved, 79-15 Fell
(September 19, 1986)




point of order a
Basis of
point of order b Subject matter Waiver motion c
Disposition of
point of order
3.  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987
To Strike Provision(s) From Bill or Conference Report
[none]






[specific basis not cited] [various topics] Approved, 81-13 [none raised]
4.  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 e
To Strike Provision(s) From Bill or Conference Report
[none]




point of order a
Basis of
point of order b Subject matter Waiver motion c
Disposition of
point of order
5.  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990
To Strike Provision(s) From Bill or Conference Report




None Sustained; subsection stricken
(October 17, 1990)
Page 1017, line 5-p. 1018,
line 19; and p. 1018, line
22-p. 1019, line 18
Budgetary changes





None Sustained; provisions stricken
(October 18, 1990)
Sections 4003-4016 No change in outlays or
revenues
Harvesting of timber in the
Tongass National Forest in
Alaska
None Sustained; sections stricken
(October 18, 1990)
Title III, Subtitle B (as
modified)
No change in outlays or
revenues
National aviation noise policy,
limitations on airport
improvement program
revenues, high density traffic




To Bar Consideration of Amendment(s)
Graham Amendment No.
3025










No change in outlays or
revenues
Deposit of all increased motor
fuel taxes (other than taxes on
railroads) into Highway Trust
Fund




point of order a
Basis of
point of order b Subject matter Waiver motion c
Disposition of
point of order
6.  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
To Strike Provision(s) From Bill or Conference Report
Section 1105(c) No change in outlays or
revenues
Commercial use of bovine
growth hormone in other
countries
Rejected, 38-60 Sustained; subsection stricken
(June 24, 1993)
Section 7801; Section
7803(a) (proposing in part
new Sections 2106 and




No change in outlays or
revenues
Childhood immunizations and
tax return preparer standards
None Sustained; most provisions stricken f
(June 24, 1993)
Section 13631(b)
(proposing in part a new
Section 1928 of the Social
Security Act)





Childhood immunizations None Fell.  Motion to appeal Chair’s
ruling rejected, 43-57
(August 6, 1993)
Section 1106(a) Budgetary changes
merely incidental to non-
budgetary components
Imposition of domestic
content requirements on U.S.
cigarette manufacturers





point of order a
Basis of
point of order b Subject matter Waiver motion c
Disposition of
point of order
6.  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993—continued
To Bar Consideration of Amendment(s)
Domenici/Nunn
Amendment No. 544
No change in outlays or
revenues





















Rejected, 43-55 Sustained; amendment fell
(June 24, 1993)
7.  Balanced Budget Act of 1995
To Strike Provision(s) From Bill or Conference Report
Section 7171 No change in outlays or
revenues
Raising the age of Medicare
eligibility
None Sustained; section stricken
(October 27, 1995)
Section 7191(a) No change in outlays or
revenues
Bar against the use of federal
funding of abortions under
Medicaid
Rejected, 55-45 Sustained; subsection stricken
(October 27, 1995)
49 provisions in various
titles of the bill
[various bases cited] [various topics, dealing
primarily with welfare
reform]
Rejected, 53-46 Sustained against 46 provisions,
which were stricken; not sustained





point of order a
Basis of
point of order b Subject matter Waiver motion c
Disposition of
point of order
7.  Balanced Budget Act of 1995—continued
Section 8001 (proposing
in part a new Section
1853(f) to the Social
Security Act) and Section
13301





Application of antitrust rule to
provider-sponsored
organizations (MedicarePlus)
and exemption of physician
office laboratories.
Rejected, 54-45 Sustained; provisions stricken from
conference report
(November 17, 1995)
To Bar Consideration of Amendment(s)
Dorgan Amendment No.
2977
[specific basis not cited] Ending deferral for U.S.








No change in outlays or
revenues
Expressing sense of the
Senate regarding a flat tax




No change in outlays or
revenues
Prohibition against the scoring
of assets sales as budget
savings




No change in outlays or
revenues
Increase time limit on debate
in Senate on reconciliation
legislation




point of order a
Basis of
point of order b Subject matter Waiver motion c
Disposition of
point of order
8.  Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
To Strike Provision(s) From Bill or Conference Report
Section 2923 (proposing a
new Section 1511 of the
Social Security Act), page







None Sustained; provision stricken
(July 18, 1996)
Section 408(a)(2) No change in outlays or
revenues
Family cap (no additional
cash assistance for children
born to families receiving
assistance)
Rejected, 42-57 Sustained; provision stricken
(July 23, 1996)
Section 2104 No change in outlays or
revenues









Rejected, 52-46 Sustained; provision stricken
(July 23, 1996)
22 provisions in various
titles of the bill
[various bases cited] Various topics involving the
Food Stamp, School Lunch,
and Child Nutrition programs
and welfare reform
None Sustained against 21 provisions,
which were stricken from the bill;
not sustained against 1 provision,




point of order a
Basis of
point of order b Subject matter Waiver motion c
Disposition of
point of order
8.  Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996—continued
To Bar Consideration of Amendment(s)
First Modified
Amendment No. 4914
No change in outlays or
revenues
Expressing the sense of
Congress that the President
should ensure approval of
state welfare reform waiver
requests
Rejected, 55-43 Sustained; amendment fell
(July 19, 1996)
9.  Balanced Budget Act of 1997
To Strike Provision(s) From Bill or Conference Report
Section 5611 No change in outlays or
revenues




Section 5822 Budgetary changes









Section 1949(a)(2) No change in outlays or
revenues
Bar against the use of federal
funding of abortions under
Medicaid
None [point of order withdrawn]




[various topics] None Sustained; sections stricken
(June 25, 1997)
Section 5001 No change in outlays or
revenues







point of order a
Basis of
point of order b Subject matter Waiver motion c
Disposition of
point of order
9.  Balanced Budget Act of 1997—continued
To Bar Consideration of Amendment(s)
Levin Amendment No.
482
No change in outlays or
revenues
Allowing vocational
educational training to be
counted as a work activity
under the Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families
program




Increase in deficit or
reduction of surplus in
fiscal year beyond those
covered by instructions




[no basis cited] Immediate transfer to
Medicare Part B of certain
home health benefits
Rejected, 38-62 Sustained; amendment fell
(June 25, 1997)
10.  Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997
To Strike Provision(s) From Bill or Conference Report














Section 1604(f)(3) No change in outlays or
revenues






point of order a
Basis of
point of order b Subject matter Waiver motion c
Disposition of
point of order
10.  Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997—continued
To Bar Consideration of Amendment(s)
Gramm Amendment No.
566








[no basis cited] Prohibition against scoring,
for budget purposes, revenues
from sale of certain federal
lands




No change in outlays or
revenues
Prohibition in PAYGO budget
process against using tax
increases to pay for
mandatory spending increases








Rejected, 57-43 Sustained; amendment fell
(June 27, 1997)








No change in outlays or
revenues
Reservation of future revenue
windfalls for tax or deficit
reduction




point of order a
Basis of
point of order b Subject matter Waiver motion c
Disposition of
point of order
11.  Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999
To Strike Provision(s) From Bill or Conference Report
Section 1502 Increase in deficit or
reduction of surplus in
fiscal year beyond those
covered by instructions
General extension of revenue-
reduction provisions
Rejected, 51-48 Sustained; section stricken
(July 28, 1999)
Section 202 Increase in outlays Enhancement of the Earned
Income Tax Credit for
married couples
Approved, voice vote [none raised]
To Bar Consideration of Amendment(s)
Bingaman  Amendment
No. 1462
No change in outlays or
revenues
Expressing the sense of the
Senate regarding investment
in education




No change in outlays or
revenues
Expressing the sense of the
Senate regarding the Medicare
Reserve Fund
Rejected, 54-46 Sustained; amendment fell
(July 30, 1999)
12.  Marriage Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2000
To Strike Provision(s) From Bill or Conference Report
Section 4 Increase in outlays Enhancement of the Earned
Income Tax Credit for
married couples
On July 17, the waiver
motion (made on July
14) was changed to a
unanimous consent





point of order a
Basis of
point of order b Subject matter Waiver motion c
Disposition of
point of order
12.  Marriage Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2000—continued
To Bar Consideration of Amendment(s)
Roth Amendment No.
3864
Increase in deficit or
reduction of surplus in
fiscal year beyond those
covered by instructions










Increase in deficit or
reduction of surplus in
fiscal year beyond those
covered by instructions








13.  Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
To Strike Provision(s) From Bill or Conference Report
[none]
To Bar Consideration of Amendment(s)
[none]
14.  Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003




point of order a
Basis of
point of order b Subject matter Waiver motion c
Disposition of
point of order
14.  Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003—continued
To Bar Consideration of Amendment(s)
Sessions Amendment
No. 639
Increase in deficit or
reduction of surplus in
fiscal year beyond those
covered by instructions
Applying the sunset
provision to the revenue
increase provisions
Rejected, 51-49 Sustained; amendment fell
(May 15, 2003)
a  The Byrd rule is Section 313 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, as amended (2 U.S.C. 644).  There are many point-of-order provisions in Titles III and IV of the Act.  In some
instances, points of order or waiver motions are made under the Act by general reference only (such as a Senator raising a point of order “under Title III of the Act”) rather than
by specific reference to the provision(s) involved.  When only general references are made, it usually is impossible to determine (by reference to debate in the Congressional
Record alone) which provision of the Act is involved.  Consequently, this table reflects only those instances when specific reference was made to Section 313 of the Act or to
the Byrd rule.  The object of a point of order under the Byrd rule may be to strike one or more provisions (as designated by title or section number, or by page and line number)
in a reconciliation measure or a conference report thereon, or to bar consideration of one or more amendments thereto.
b  A provision is regarded as extraneous under the Byrd rule if it:
(1) does not produce a change in outlays or revenues;
(2) produces an outlay increase or revenue decrease when the instructed committee is not in compliance with its instructions;
(3) is outside of the jurisdiction of the committee that submitted the title or provision for inclusion in the reconciliation measure;
(4) produces a change in outlays or revenues which is merely incidental to the non-budgetary components of the provision;
(5) would increase the deficit for a fiscal year beyond those covered by the reconciliation measure; or
(6) recommends changes in Social Security.
The Byrd rule sets forth specific exceptions to the criteria to determine extraneousness.
c  Under the Byrd rule, a successful waiver motion requires the affirmative vote of three-fifths of the membership (60 Senators if no seats are vacant).  A single waiver motion can:
(1) apply to the Byrd rule as well as other provisions of the Congressional Budget Act;  (2) involve multiple as well as single provisions or amendments; (3) extend (for specified
language) through consideration of the conference report as well as initial consideration of the measure or amendment; and (4) be made prior to the raising of a point of order,
thus making the point of order moot.
d  On October 24, 1985, Senator Robert C. Byrd offered an amendment containing the Byrd rule to the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985, which
the Senate adopted.  In this form, the Byrd rule applied to initial Senate consideration of reconciliation measures.  On December 19, 1985, the Senate adopted S.Res. 286, which
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extended the application of portions of the provision in COBRA of 1985 to conference reports and amendments between the two Houses.  Because the enactment of COBRA
of 1985 was delayed until early 1986, the portion of the Byrd rule dealing with conference reports became effective first.  Senate consideration of the conference report on COBRA
of 1985, and amendments between the two Houses thereon, occurred beginning on December 19, 1985.  Therefore, only the portion of the Byrd rule dealing with conference
reports and amendments between the two Houses applied during the consideration of COBRA of 1985.  No actions were taken under the rule.
e  On October 13, 1989, during consideration of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, the Senate adopted Mitchell Amendment No. 1004 by voice vote.  The amendment
struck extraneous matter from the bill; its stated purpose was “to strike all matter from the bill that does not reduce the deficit” (see the Congressional Record of October 13,
1989, at page S 13349).
f  The point of order was not sustained against that part of Section 7803(a) proposing a new Section 2106 of the Social Security Act.
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Appendix A.  Text of the Byrd Rule
(Section 313 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974)
EXTRANEOUS MATTER IN RECONCILIATION LEGISLATION
Sec. 313. (a) In General.—When the Senate is considering a reconciliation
bill or a reconciliation resolution pursuant to Section 310, (whether that bill or
resolution originated in the Senate or the House) or Section 258C of the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 upon a point of order being made
by any Senator against material extraneous to the instructions to a committee which
is contained in any title or provision of the bill or resolution or offered as an
amendment to the bill or resolution, and the point of order is sustained by the Chair,
any part of said title or provision that contains material extraneous to the instructions
to said Committee as defined in subsection (b) shall be deemed stricken from the bill
and may not be offered as an amendment from the floor.
(b) Extraneous Provisions.—(1)
(A)  Except as provided in paragraph (2), a provision of a reconciliation
bill or reconciliation resolution considered pursuant to Section 310 shall be
considered extraneous if such provision does not produce a change in outlays
or revenues, including changes in outlays and revenues brought about by
changes in the terms and conditions under which outlays are made or revenues
are required to be collected (but a provision in which outlay decreases or
revenue increases exactly offset outlay increases or revenue decreases shall not
be considered extraneous by virtue of this subparagraph);
(B) any provision producing an increase in outlays or decrease in revenues
shall be considered extraneous if the net effect of provisions reported by the
Committee reporting the title containing the provision is that the Committee
fails to achieve its reconciliation instructions;
(C) a provision that is not in the jurisdiction of the Committee with
jurisdiction over said title or provision shall be considered extraneous;
(D) a provision shall be considered extraneous if it produces changes in
outlays or revenues which are merely incidental to the non-budgetary
components of the provision;
(E) a provision shall be considered to be extraneous if it increases, or
would increase, net outlays, or if it decreases, or would decrease, revenues
during a fiscal year after the fiscal years covered by such reconciliation bill or
reconciliation resolution, and such increases or decreases are greater than outlay
reductions or revenue increases resulting from other provisions in such title in
such year; and
(F) a provision shall be considered extraneous if it violates Section
310(g).
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(2) A Senate-originated provision shall not be considered extraneous under
paragraph (1)(A) if the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Committee
on the Budget and the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Committee
which reported the provision certify that:
(A) the provision mitigates direct effects clearly attributable to a provision
changing outlays or revenues and both provisions together produce a net
reduction in the deficit;
(B) the provision will result in a substantial reduction in outlays or a
substantial increase in revenues during fiscal years after the fiscal years covered
by the reconciliation bill or reconciliation resolution;
(C) a reduction of outlays or an increase in revenues is likely to occur as
a result of the provision, in the event of new regulations authorized by the
provision or likely to be proposed, court rulings on pending litigation, or
relationships between economic indices and stipulated statutory triggers
pertaining to the provision, other than the regulations, court rulings or
relationships currently projected by the Congressional Budget Office for
scorekeeping purposes; or
(D) such provisions will be likely to produce a significant reduction in
outlays or increases in revenues but, due to insufficient data, such reduction or
increase cannot be reliably estimated.
(3) A provision reported by a committee shall not be considered extraneous
under paragraph (1)(C) if
(A) the provision is an integral part of a provision or title, which if
introduced as a bill or resolution would be referred to such committee, and the
provision sets forth the procedure to carry out or implement the substantive
provisions that were reported and which fall within the jurisdiction of such
committee; or
(B) the provision states an exception to, or a special application of, the
general provision or title of which it is a part and such general provision or title
if introduced as a bill or resolution would be referred to such committee.
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(c) Extraneous Materials.—Upon the reporting or discharge of a
reconciliation bill or resolution pursuant to Section 310 in the Senate, and again upon
the submission of a conference report on such reconciliation bill or resolution, the
Committee on the Budget of the Senate shall submit for the record a list of material
considered to be extraneous under subsections (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), and (b)(1)(E) of
this section to the instructions of a committee as provided in this section.  The
inclusion or exclusion of a provision shall not constitute a determination of
extraneousness by the Presiding Officer of the Senate.
(d) Conference Reports.—When the Senate is considering a conference
report on, or an amendment between the Houses in relation to, a reconciliation bill
or reconciliation resolution pursuant to Section 310, upon —
(1) a point of order being made by an Senator against extraneous material
meeting the definition of subsections (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), (b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E),
or (b)(1)(F), and
(2) such point of order being sustained, such material contained in such
conference report or amendment shall be deemed stricken, and the Senate shall
proceed, without intervening action or motion, to consider the question of
whether the Senate shall recede from its amendment and concur with a further
amendment, or concur in the House amendment with a further amendment, as
the case may be, which further amendment shall consist of only that portion of
the conference report or House amendment, as the case may be, not so stricken.
Any such motion in the Senate shall be debatable for 2 hours.  In any case in
which such point of order is sustained against a conference report (or Senate
amendment derived from such conference report by operation of this
subsection), no further amendment shall be in order.
(e) General Point of Order.  —  Notwithstanding any other law or rule of the
Senate, it shall be in order for a Senator to raise a single point of order that several
provisions of a bill, resolution, amendment, motion, or conference report violate this
section.  The Presiding Officer may sustain the point of order as to some or all of the
provisions against which the Senator raised the point of order.  If the Presiding
Officer so sustains the point of order as to some of the provisions (including
provisions of an amendment, motion, or conference report) against which the Senator
raised the point of order, then only those provisions (including provisions of an
amendment, motion, or conference report) against which the Presiding Officer
sustains the point or order shall be deemed stricken pursuant to this section.  Before
the Presiding Officer rules on such a point of order, any Senator may move to waive
such a point of order as it applies to some or all of the provisions against which the
point of order was raised.  Such a motion to waive is amendable in accordance with
the rules and precedents of the Senate.  After the Presiding Officer rules on such a
point of order, any Senator may appeal the ruling of the Presiding Officer on such a
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point of order as it applies to some or all of the provisions on which the Presiding
Officer ruled.
